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Abstract
This paper continues my work of [12] and [13], which showed there is a broad family of
propositional many valued logics that have a strict/tolerant counterpart. Here we generalize
those results from propositional to a range of both modal and quantified many valued logics,
providing strict/tolerant counterparts for all. This paper is not self-contained; some results from
[12] are called on, and are not reproved here. The key new machinery added to earlier work,
allowing modalities and quantifiers to be handled in similar ways, is the central use of bilattices
that are function spaces, and more generally lattices that are function spaces. Two versions of
the central proofs are considered, one at length and the other in outline.
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1 Introduction
I begin with a quick sketch of my work leading up to this paper, followed by a longer general
discussion of just what it is that I’m talking about here. This paper is the fourth and probably
last in a series. The first, [15], introduced a mechanism for constructing strict/tolerant proposi-
tional logics that correspond to a wide range of many-valued logics, generalizing the basic ideas
of [3], [5] to an infinite family. The second and main paper, [12], presented this generalization
in much more detail, and showed it extended to the hierarchy constructions of [2], [27]. The
third, [13], examined to what extent the results extend to strict/tolerant logics based on natural
generalizations of the weak Kleene three valued logic. Finally, the present paper further extends
the work to encompass modal operators and quantifiers. In all cases, including this paper, the
basic construction is largely the same. It is the scope of applicability of that construction that
is being examined.
Let us represent a consequence relation using sequent notation, Γ =⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆
are finite sets of formulas built up using conjunction, disjunction, and negation. (Later modal
and quantificational machinery will be considered as well.) Strict/Tolerant logic, ST, is a three-
valued logic in which such a consequence relation holds premises to higher standards than it
does the conclusions drawn from them. Say the truth values are {0, 12 , 1}, which also serve as
truth values for both Kleene’s strong three valued logic, K3, and for Priest’s logic of paradox,
LP. Truth tables for conjunction, disjunction, and negation in ST are the same as those for K3,
which are the same as those for LP. The logics K3 and LP differ in their choice of designated
truth values: K3 uses {1}, while LP adopts the more generous { 12 , 1}. ST mixes things by using
the Kleene standard for premises of its consequence relation, but allowing the Priest standard
for conclusions. This is the precise meaning attached to what was loosely described above as
holding premises to higher standards than conclusions.
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Remarkably, ST has the same set of valid sequents as classical logic, but differs from classical
logic at the (local) meta-consequence level. This challenges a common view that logics are
characterized by their consequence relations. Starting from this point, an entire hierarchy of
strict/tolerant logics has been developed, whose members agree with classical logic on validities
up to some meta-meta-meta-. . . level, but differ at the next. A dual version involving anti-
validities has also been created. All this has given rise to much research centering around the
questions of what constitutes a logic, and what makes two logics the same, or different. The
primary ST developments are found in [2], [3], [5], [27], [29]. The present paper is the fourth
in a sequence containing my contributions to the subject, all showing that the main features
connecting classical logic and ST are more widespread than had first been realized: there is
a broad range of many valued logics with strict/tolerant counterparts, and now that extends
to many valued modal and quantificational logics as well. All of my papers are based on the
same algebraic construction, which will be discussed informally after sketching the necessary
background.
In the first of my papers on this subject, [15], the basic idea was to use the machinery of
bilattices, associating them with many valued logics meeting certain natural conditions, then
extracting appropriate strict/tolerant logics from the associated bilattices. My proofs were
direct generalizations of the previous work of others for ST. Even the underlying ideas were the
same, when properly looked at. In the three valued logic based on {0, 12 , 1}, one thinks of 0 as
false, 1 as true, and one might think of 12 as both true and false. When starting with a many
valued logic extending 0 and 1, the role of bilattices is to provide a set of values, analogous
to 12 , representing various degrees of inconsistency into which the original many values can be
merged. Of course this is rather vague, but the similarities with the original ST are rather clear.
What is surprising is the very broad range of propositional logics to which they can be applied.
The second of my papers on strict/tolerant logics, [12], carried this work further. First, the
use of bilattice machinery was examined more carefully, and specific algebraic details about the
resulting strict and tolerant designated sets were extracted. And second, the work on hierarchies
of strict/tolerant logics, [2], [3], [5], [29], was extended to a broad range of many valued logics
as were the results from [27] on anti-validity. The fundamentals were the same as in [15], but
more of interest was extracted from them.
After [12] appeared, I realized that my conditions were too strong. Specifically, I had required
that for the many valued logics I considered, the set of designated values should be a prime filter.
It turned out that only being upward closed was needed, and in fact was all that I used. Details
of the proofs need no changes. In [13] this was made explicit, and that usage is continued here.
It was in [13], the third paper in my series, that I examined the general question of which of
the many-valued logics from my earlier papers had a strict/tolerant counterpart in which the
connectives obeyed conditions that generalized those of Kleene’s weak three valued logic instead
of his strong version. Briefly stated, it turned out to be those many-valued logics that were
orthocomplemented. That is, for which x ∧ ¬x = 0 and x ∨ ¬x = 1.
In the present paper I show that my results generally extend to a similarly broad range of
many valued logics with quantifiers, and also with modal operators (which are close relatives of
quantifiers). This should not be too surprising, and has been noted before for the original ST
setting. In the modal case, for instance, one applies my methods world by world, verifying that
these world by world results all fit together appropriately. Arguments are needed, of course,
but they are rather natural. There is also a second approach, along somewhat different lines,
that could have been taken, and this is discussed briefly in the concluding section of the paper.
The modal logics considered here are all generalizations of normal modal logics. It is likely that
the methods extend to generalizations of regular modal logics as well, but this has not been
verified. How far things can be pushed is a subject for a different time, and perhaps a different
investigator.
It must be emphasized that in the present paper the terminology and results of [12] are
assumed known, along with the weaker conditions presented in [13]. There is too much to repeat
here in any detail, though there will be partial summaries as needed.
Here is a quick sketch of the basic idea for the modal case—the quantificational case is
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analogous—and details are given later in this paper. Semantically, modal frames can be used
with many valued logics so that each world individually behaves in a many valued way; see [23]
for instance. The basic idea here is that such a setup itself can be thought of as a single more
complex many valued logic. Suppose L is the set of truth values of some many-valued logic, and
G is a set of possible worlds. The function space LG can be taken to be a many valued logic in its
own right. Since we generally require a many valued logic L to be a lattice, the function space
LG will inherit a pointwise ordering and will, itself, be a lattice. Thus we have natural function
space interpretations for ∧ and ∨. We also require a truth value space L to be a Morgan algebra
(a term introduced in [12] for a De Morgan algebra without a distributivity condition). This
too is inherited pointwise by the function space LG , and provides a natural interpretation for
negation. All this means that our earlier work can be applied, not to the underlying space L of
truth values but to the function space LG . In a similar way the quantificational setting can be
treated as a function space.
There do need to be some enhancements to our earlier work. The function space idea as
sketched so far, using LG , provides no interpretation for the modal operators, or for quantifiers.
This is quite straightforward, and exact details are deferred until later but essentially, in the
same way that conjunction and disjunction can be modeled by lattice meet and join, quantifiers
can be modeled algebraically by arbitrary meets and joins. However, we now must allow that
such meets and joins may be infinitary. Likewise modal operators act like quantifiers relativized
to accessible worlds. What this tells us is that a simple lattice structure for the underlying space
L of truth values is not enough. We will need closure under infinite meets and joins as well,
so we will need a complete lattice. There are no unexpected complications that result from a
completeness condition, all earlier work extends easily, but details need to be checked.
Finally, there is actually more than one natural notion of consequence. ‘Local’ and ‘global’
are common pieces of terminology here; see Section 8 of [12] for instance. In modal logics there
is a long and explicit history of such a distinction. In a Kripke model based on classical logic, for
instance, we have local consequence: Γ =⇒ ∆ is validated by valuation v if, at at each possible
world where every member of Γ is true under v, some member of ∆ is true under v. But we also
have global consequence: Γ =⇒ ∆ is validated by valuation v provided, if every member of Γ is
valid under v in the model, then some member of ∆ is valid under v in the model, where being
valid under v in a model means that v assigns the value true at each possible world of the model.
These are far from being the same. For instance, (X ∧ Y ) =⇒ X is locally valid (no matter
what the frame), and it easily follows that it is globally valid. But X =⇒ X is globally valid,
while it is not locally so. These examples were modal, but there are similar examples involving
quantifiers. Using a function space LG , associated with a many valued Kripke model as briefly
discussed above, both local and global consequence have their associated sets of designated truth
values, and they are different.
But now it is time to begin introducing our formal material. Sections 2, 3, and 4 are
background, to establish terminology and notation. Our new material begins in Section 5
2 Lattice Background
Lattices are fundamental to every aspect of our approach to the subject. In particular, truth
value spaces will be lattices, generally denoted L to suggest ‘lattice.’ Here are standard defini-
tions and terminology that we will use.
Definition 2.1 (Lattices) A lattice is a set with a partial ordering, 〈L,≤〉, in which every pair
of elements has a greatest lower bound or meet, and a least upper bound, or join. We generally
abbreviate lattice 〈L,≤〉 by L when no confusion will result. We denote meet of x and y by
x ∧ y and join by x ∨ y. A lattice is complete if there are meets and joins for arbitrary subsets.
For a subset S of complete lattice L its meet is denoted
∧
S and its join by
∨
S. A lattice is
bounded if it has a least and a greatest element. A complete lattice is automatically bounded
since
∧
∅ is the largest member and
∨
∅ is the smallest.
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Lattices will be our spaces of truth values. Generally some truth values are called designated.
These can be thought of as generalized versions of true from classical logic. We typically denote
the set of such values by D, to suggest ‘designated.’ It should be emphasized that we always
make the general assumption that D is proper, that is, it is not empty and does not contain all
truth values.
Definition 2.2 (Designated Set Conditions) Let L = 〈L,≤〉 be a lattice, assumed com-
plete for 4 and 5, and let D be a proper subset of L. D is:
1. upward closed, or upclosed, or an upset, if x ∈ D and x ≤ y implies y ∈ D;
2. a filter if it is upward closed and x, y ∈ D implies x ∧ y ∈ D;
3. a prime filter if it is a filter and x ∨ y ∈ D implies x ∈ D or y ∈ D;
4. a complete filter if it is upward closed and, for every E ⊆ D,
∧
E ∈ D;
5. a completely prime filter it is a complete filter and for every E ⊆ L, if
∨
E ∈ D then
E ∩D 6= ∅.
Trivially every complete filter is a filter, and every completely prime filter is a prime filter.
Lattices generalize the usual truth value space, containing truth and falsehood. They serve in
this role throughout, but a special kind is needed for semantically generalizing quantified and
modal logics.
Definition 2.3 (Function Space Lattices) Suppose L = 〈L,≤〉 is a lattice and S is a non-
empty set. The function space LS of all functions from S to L, is assigned a pointwise ordering:
for f, g ∈ LS , f ≤ g if and only if f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ S.
It is straightforward to check that LS is a lattice itself, with pointwise operations:
(f ∧ g)(x) = f(x) ∧ g(x),
(f ∨ g)(x) = f(x) ∨ g(x).










{f(x) | f ∈ E}.
Suppose L is a lattice and D ⊆ L. As a set, LS has DS as a subset. DS inherits several
properties from D, but this does not extend to being a prime filter. The following provides a
way around this problem, if it actually is a problem. [I suspect this exists in the literature, and
there is already terminology for it, but I can’t find it.]
Definition 2.4 (Local and Global Designated Sets) Let L be a lattice, D be a subset of
L, and S be a non-empty set. We call DS a global designated set. And, for each a ∈ S let LSa→D
be the set of all functions from S to L that map a to some member of D. We call LSa→D a local
designated set. The ordering of both sets of functions is pointwise, inherited from LS .
Although we won’t actually need most of the following for our main results, we state it all
for the record.
Proposition 2.5 For lattice L, D ⊆ L, and non-empty set S:
1. If D is upward closed in L then both DS and LSa→D are upward closed on L
S, for every
a ∈ S;
2. if D is a filter on L then both DS and LSa→D are filters on L
S, for every a ∈ S;
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3. if L is a complete lattice and D is a complete filter, both DS and LSa→D are complete filters
on LS, for every a ∈ S;
4. if D is a prime filter on L then LSa→D is a prime filter on L
S, for every a ∈ S;
5. if L is a complete lattice and D is a completely prime filter then LSa→D is a completely
prime filter on LS, for every a ∈ S;
6. DS is never a prime filter on LS provided S has more than one member and L is a bounded
lattice;
7. if L is a complete lattice then DS is never a completely prime filter on LS provided S has
more than one member;




a→D (here the meet operation is that of the
function space DS).
Proof This is left to the reader, except that we supply details for 6. Suppose L is bounded, S
has more than one member, and D is a prime filter in S. Since D is proper it cannot contain
the least member of L, call it 0, because of upward closure, but likewise since D is non-empty
it must contain the greatest member of L, call it 1. Suppose that S contains a and b, which
are different. Let f, g ∈ LS be such that f(a) = 0 and otherwise f(x) = 1, and g(b) = 0 and
otherwise g(x) = 1. Then f ∨ g ∈ DS since it is the function that is identically 1, but neither f
nor g is in DS .
We will see that these two kinds of filters, DS and LSa→D, are related to the local and global
distinction mentioned in Section 1.
3 Morgan Algebra Background
Lattices provide machinery for interpreting conjunctions and disjunctions, but not negations.
For this De Morgan algebras could be appropriate tools, but these require distributivity which
we never need. In [12] we gave the name Morgan algebra to a system like a De Morgan algebra
but without a requirement of distributivity, and we continue that practice here. (Dropping ‘De’
is to suggest dropping d istributivity.)
Definition 3.1 (Morgan Algebra) A Morgan algebra is a bounded distributive lattice with
an order reversing involution, which we write as an overbar. Then, in a Morgan algebra, a ≤ b
implies b ≤ a, and also a = a. A De Morgan algebra is a Morgan algebra in which both
distributive laws hold.
In a Morgan algebra a ∨ b = a ∧ b and a ∧ b = a ∨ b. If a Morgan algebra is complete as








E, where E = {x | x ∈
E}. The smallest and largest members of a Morgan algebra are mapped to each other by the
involution. Morgan algebras provide us with natural truth value spaces and interpretations for
∧, ∨, and ¬ as meet, join, and involution, and we assume this is how propositional formulas
are generally evaluated from now on. Quantifiers will be interpreted using infinitary meets and
joins, and modal operators similarly.
Function space lattices were characterized in Definition 2.3. If L is not just a lattice but a
Morgan algebra and S is a non-empty set, then LS , is also a Morgan algebra, where for f ∈ LS
the involution is given pointwise by f(x) = f(x).
Morgan algebras provide a family of truth value spaces but as noted earlier, to have logics
we also need sets of designated truth values, and we want these to have some natural structural
properties. Being a prime filter is common. In [12] we used the term logical Morgan algebra for
the combination of Morgan algebra and a prime filter, but now we want primeness to be optional.
We generally follow the terminology used in [13], but in addition we also need conditions of
completeness to handle infinitary operations. This leads us to the following.
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Definition 3.2 (Logical Morgan Algebras) Let L be a Morgan algebra and D ⊆ L. The
structure 〈L,D〉 is:
1. an upclosed logical Morgan algebra if D is an upwardly closed proper subset of the lattice
L;
2. an upclosed complete logical Morgan algebra if it is an upclosed logical Morgan algebra and
L is complete lattice.
4 Many-Valued Logic Background
A semantically defined many valued propositional logic typically is characterized using some set
of truth values, some operations on those truth values corresponding to the operation symbols of
a propositional language, and a subset of truth values called designated. This give a very wide
range of possibilities. Here things are considerably restricted within this general framework.
Our basic propositional language is built up from propositional letters using the operation
symbols ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), and ¬ (negation). We use L for the formal language
just described. Further on in the paper we will consider richer languages and different language
names will be used, but all languages will include the connectives of L. Note that we do not have
an implication primitive. One can, of course, take implication as defined, ¬X ∨ Y . Whether or
not this is a good choice depends on the Morgan algebra used, and what features of implication
are desired. A detailed investigation of implication in this context is called for, but is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
A truth value space here will always be a Morgan algebra, with meet, join, and involution
used to interpret conjunction, disjunction, and negation. Other logical operations will be added
as appropriate. The subset of designated truth values will always be upwards closed, and thus
the underlying many valued structure used propositionally is that of an upclosed logical Morgan
algebra, Definition 3.2.
A propositional valuation in a weak logical Morgan algebra 〈L,D〉 is a mapping v from the
atomic formulas of the language L to the Morgan algebra L. It is extended (uniquely) to all
formulas using the recursive conditions
v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y )
v(X ∨ Y ) = v(X) ∨ v(Y )
v(¬X) = v(X)
(1)
where, for instance, ∧ on the left is an formal symbol of L and on the right is the meet operation
of L. We use v for both the mapping on atomic formulas and for its extension to all formulas,
and are generally casual about the distinction between them.
A sequent is an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas. Typically sequents are written with
an arrow between the two sets. We will be using =⇒ as the arrow, and later it will have
a ‘decoration’ to indicate properties more specialized than what is considered in this section.
Then Γ =⇒ ∆ is a sequent, where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulas. Validity for sequents, in
our many valued setting, is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Many Valued Validity) Let 〈L,D〉 be a logical Morgan algebra and let v
be an arbitrary valuation in it.
〈L,D〉 |=v Γ =⇒ ∆ if v(X) ∈ D for every X ∈ Γ
implies v(Y ) ∈ D for some Y ∈ ∆.
〈L,D〉 |= Γ =⇒ ∆ if 〈L,D〉 |=v Γ =⇒ ∆ for every valuation v.
Of course if L is the familiar Boolean structure {0, 1}, with 0 ≤ 1, and D = {1}, a prime
filter in this structure, then 〈L,D〉 |= Γ =⇒ ∆ is the usual classical consequence relation.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:6) 2021, Article no. 2
622
5 Many-Valued Modal Logics
We detail the many-valued modal logic machinery used here. To avoid any confusion it should
be noted that in [8], [9] we investigated a class of many-valued modal logics in which the
frame accessibility relations themselves could be many valued, but that is not the case now.
Frames here are quite standard and accessibility is a conventional classical relation. Likewise
we generally do not follow [23]; in particular our propositional connectives will be confined to
∧, ∨, and ¬, without an implication, and are interpreted in a Morgan algebra as sketched in
Section 4. This Morgan algebra provides us with the behavior of propositional connectives
within worlds. In turn it, plus a frame, induces another Morgan algebra that takes the entire
set of possible worlds into account, to allow the modeling of many valued modal operators. For
this it is essential that our underlying space of truth values be a complete Morgan algebra since
modal evaluation will involve meets and joins over the frame, which itself may be infinite. Here
are the details.
Syntactically we expand the propositional language L from Section 4 by adding the familiar
prefix symbols  and ♦, and we use M to designate this modal language.
Semantically we work over a modal frame, F = 〈G,R〉, where G is a non-empty set of possible
worlds and R is an accessibility relation on G. We assume we have a complete Morgan algebra
L, which specifies the behavior of the propositional connectives. As usual, a modal valuation
can behave differently at different possible worlds, so instead of a valuation simply assigning a
value in L itself, it assigns a value that depends on a possible world. Consequently a modal
valuation here maps formulas of the language M not to L but to LG , the set of all functions
from G to L. LG is given a pointwise ordering, Definition 2.3, and is itself a complete Morgan
algebra. Then we have the usual Morgan algebra machinery in LG to interpret propositional
connectives. In addition we introduce two mappings to interpret the modal operators.




{f(b) | b ∈ G and aRb}
 f = λa.
∨
{f(b) | b ∈ G and aRb}
These operations are duals, and so the present generalization of modality is not broad enough
to cover logics in which necessity and possibility are independent of each other.
Proposition 5.2 (Duality) For the mappings   and   from LG to itself, and for each f ∈ LG,
 f =  f and  f =  f .
Proof We show the first; the second is similar. For each f ∈ LG and each a ∈ G:
 f(a) =
∨
{f(b) | b ∈ G and aRb} Definition 5.1
=
∨
{f(b) | b ∈ G and aRb} pointwise ordering
=
∧
{f(b) | b ∈ G and aRb} Morgan involution property
=  f(a) Definition 5.1 again
so  f(a) =  f(a).
The operations also have a monotonicity property that plays a fundamental role when we
come to strict/tolerant logics.
Proposition 5.3 (Monotonicity) In the complete Morgan algebra LG, if f ≤ g then  f ≤  g
and  f ≤  g.
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Proof Suppose f ≤ g. Since this ordering is defined pointwise, for each b ∈ G, f(b) ≤
g(b). Using the monotonicity property of infinitary meets, for arbitrary a ∈ G,
∧
{f(b) | b ∈
G and aRb} ≤
∧
{g(b) | b ∈ G and aRb}, and hence ( f)(a) ≤ ( g)(a). Since a was arbitrary,
 f ≤  g. The other is similar.
Definition 5.4 (Modal Valuation) A modal valuation v in the frame F = 〈G,R〉, with com-
plete Morgan algebra L as underlying truth value space, is a member of (LG)M that meets the
propositional conditions (1) on ∧, ∨, and ¬ for a valuation in the algebra LG , and interprets the
modal operation symbols according to Definition 5.1. In detail, we have the following.
v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y )




The two modal cases of the definition above, combined with Definition 5.1, give us the
following. For each formula X of M, and for each possible world a ∈ G:
v(X)(a) =
∧
{v(X)(b) | b ∈ G and aRb}
v(♦X)(a) =
∨
{v(X)(b) | b ∈ G and aRb}
(2)
Similar world-by-world versions obtain for the propositional connectives as well. For instance,
if the formula X ∧ Y is in M then v(X ∧ Y ) ∈ LG and v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y ), where ∧ on
the right is the meet of LG . Since members of LG are themselves mappings, for each a ∈ G,
v(X∧Y )(a) = (v(X)∧v(Y ))(a). And then since ∧ is defined pointwise in LG , (v(X)∧v(Y ))(a) =
v(X)(a) ∧ v(Y )(a). Similarly for the other propositional connectives. Then for each a ∈ G we
have the following, where the operations on the right are in L instead of in LG .
v(X ∧ Y )(a) = v(X)(a) ∧ v(Y )(a)
v(X ∨ Y )(a) = v(X)(a) ∨ v(Y )(a)
v(¬X)(a) = v(X)(a)
(3)
Note that Proposition 5.2 has as an immediate consequence that v(X)(a) = v(¬♦¬X)(a), and
v(♦X)(a) = v(¬¬X)(a).
Consequence, for modal logic, is complicated, and its nuances still have some ability to
confuse people. Speaking semantically, there is not just a local/global distinction to be made,
but a three level set of distinctions: frame, model, world. It might help to make use of some
classical notation I introduced in [7, Ch 3], and again in [10, Sect 1.4]. This is for background
only, and no actual use will be made of it in what follows. Suppose F is a set of frames and S,
U , and V are sets of formulas. The notation S |=F U → V means: for every (classical) Kripke
model M based on a frame in F , if all members of S are true at every possible world of M ,
then at every world of M at which every member of U is true, some member of V is true. In
what follows, a choice of frame is a parameter, so to speak, and what concerns us are the sets S,
U , and V , of formulas. The members of S are global premises—they should hold throughout a
model, that is, at every possible world. The members of U are local premises—we consider only
those worlds where they hold. At those worlds we want some member of V to be true—this is
our set of consequences.
In what follows we examine the many valued versions of model (or global) and possible
world (or local) consequence. We do not consider them together, as the notation just discussed
did. Instead we introduce two special purpose consequence relations,
m
=⇒ for the model level
version, and
p
=⇒ for the possible world level version. We write M〈L,D,F〉 to indicate we are
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considering modal validity based on truth values from the complete Morgan algebra L, where
D, an upwardly closed set, is the set of designated values of L, and we are working over modal
frame F (which is thus treated as a parameter). We remind the reader of Definition 2.4, for
LSa→D, which we will use with S = G, the set of possible worlds of our frame.
Definition 5.5 (Modal Consequence) Let 〈L,D〉 be an upclosed complete logical Morgan
algebra and let F = 〈G,R〉 be a frame.
Model For each modal valuation v in LG ,
Validity: M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
m
=⇒ ∆ at a ∈ G if
v(X) ∈ DG for all X ∈ Γ implies v(Y ) ∈ DG for some Y ∈ ∆
M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ m=⇒ ∆ if
M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
m
=⇒ ∆ for every modal valuation v in LG
Possible For each modal valuation v in LG ,
World M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ ∆ at a ∈ G if
Validity: v(X) ∈ LGa→D for all X ∈ Γ implies v(Y ) ∈ LGa→D for some Y ∈ ∆






=⇒ ∆ at each a ∈ G
M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ p=⇒ ∆ if
M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ ∆ for every modal valuation v in LG
We remark that for 〈L,D〉, if D is a prime filter then by Proposition 2.5 part 4, for each




=⇒ ∆ at a ∈ G if∧
{v(X) | X ∈ Γ} ∈ LGa→D implies
∨
{v(Y ) | Y ∈ ∆} ∈ LGa→D
Since Γ and ∆ are finite sets, primeness is enough—being completely prime is not needed for
this, although completeness may come up in the evaluation of modal operators occurring in
formulas of Γ or ∆. There is no similar equivalent for global validity.
Example 5.6 It is worth taking a moment to see what the two versions of modal consequence
capture in the familiar classical setting. Let L be the familiar Morgan algebra of classical logic,
{0, 1} with 0 ≤ 1, with an involution operation that switches 0 and 1, and let D = {1} be the
usual set of designated truth values. Also let F = 〈G,R〉 be any frame.
The function space filter DG contains a single function, mapping every possible world of the
frame to 1, so v(X) ∈ DG simply says that v assigns truth to X at every possible world in G.
We can think of v as a modal model built on the frame F so, rephrased, v(X) ∈ DG says X is
valid in the model v; true at every possible world. Then M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
m
=⇒ ∆ says that if
every formula of Γ is valid in model v, then some formula of ∆ is valid in model v.
The function space filter LGa→D consists of functions that are arbitrary except at a, which
must map to 1. So v(X) ∈ LGa→D says that in the model v, X is true at possible world a. Then
M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ ∆ says that in model v, at each possible world of G at which every formula
of Γ is true, some formula of ∆ is true.
Example 5.7 We are generally familiar with modal logics built on classical logic. This was
the subject of the previous example. Now let 〈L,D〉 be any upclosed complete logical Morgan
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algebra, and let F = 〈G,R〉 be any modal frame. We can still think of a valuation v as a modal
model built on frame F , but now it is a many valued model. We will say a valuation v validates
a formula at a possible world if v maps the formula to a designated value at that world. We
will say a valuation v simply validates a formula if it validates it at every possible world. Now
the following is simple to check.
1. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
m
=⇒ ∆ says that if valuation v validates every member of Γ then v
validates some member of ∆.
2. M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ m=⇒ ∆ says that every valuation that validates all members of Γ validates
some member of ∆.
3. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ ∆ at a says if v validates every member of Γ at a, then v validates
some member of ∆ at a.
4. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ ∆ says that for each possible world, if v validates every member of
Γ there, then v validates some member of ∆ there.
5. M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ p=⇒ ∆ says that for each valuation and for each possible world, if the
valuation validates every member of Γ at the possible world, then the valuation validates
some member of ∆ there.
Here are some simple connections between the two modal consequence relations.
Proposition 5.8 For an upclosed complete logical Morgan algebra 〈L,D〉 and a frame F =
〈G,R〉 we have the following. (Note: being upward closed is not actually needed.)
1. For each valuation v in LG, if M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p
=⇒ {Y } then M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
m
=⇒ {Y }
(note that there is a singleton set on the right of the sequent arrows).
2. If M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ p=⇒ {Y } then M〈L,D,F〉 |= Γ m=⇒ {Y }.
3. Neither of the above extend generally to allow arbitrary sets on the right of the sequents.
Proof Under the general assumptions we have the following.
1. Suppose M〈L,D,F〉 6|=v Γ
m
=⇒ Y . Then v(X) ∈ DG for every X ∈ Γ but v(Y ) 6∈ DG .
By the latter, there is some a ∈ G such that v(Y )(a) 6∈ D. Since v(X) ∈ DG for every
X ∈ Γ, then v(X)(a) ∈ D for every X ∈ Γ. This tells us that v(X) ∈ LGa→D for all
X ∈ Γ but v(Y ) 6∈ LGa→D, so we do not have M〈L,D,F〉 |=v Γ
p




2. Item 2 follows immediately from item 1.
3. Let 〈L,D〉 be the classical frame of Example 5.6 (in which D is a prime filter). Suppose G
has at least two elements, say a and b are in G where a 6= b. Let P,Q be atomic formulas of
M. It is easy to see that M〈L,D,F〉 |=v P ∨Q
p
=⇒ P,Q, for any valuation v. But suppose
v(P )(a) = v(Q)(b) = 1 and v(P )(b) = v(Q)(a) = 0. Then M〈L,D,F〉 6|=v P ∨Q
m
=⇒ P,Q.
For the two modal consequence relations, the following are some general properties that are




Proposition 5.9 Let 〈L,D〉 be an upclosed complete logical Morgan algebra, and let F = 〈G,R〉
be a frame.
1. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v (X ∧ Y )
p
=⇒ X and M〈L,D,F〉 |=v (X ∧ Y )
p
=⇒ Y .
2. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v ♦X
p
=⇒ ♦(X ∨ Y ) and M〈L,D,F〉 |=v ♦Y
p
=⇒ ♦(X ∨ Y ).
3. If D is a complete filter, M〈L,D,F〉 |=v X,Y
p
=⇒ (X ∧ Y ).
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4. If D is a completely prime filter, M〈L,D,F〉 |=v ♦(X ∨ Y )
p
=⇒ ♦X,♦Y .
5. If D is a complete filter, M〈L,D,F〉 |=v X
m
=⇒ X.
6. M〈L,D,F〉 |=v X
p
=⇒ X is not generally true.
Proof Assume the hypotheses.
1. First a preliminary result. For any b ∈ G, v(X ∧ Y )(b) = [v(X) ∧ v(Y )](b) = v(X)(b) ∧
v(Y )(b) ≤ v(X)(b). So for any a ∈ G,
∧
{v(X ∧ Y )(b) | aRb} ≤
∧
{v(X)(b) | aRb}.
Now let a be an arbitrary member of G and suppose v((X ∧Y )) ∈ LGa→D. Then v((X ∧
Y ))(a) ∈ D, so by definition,
∧
{v(X ∧ Y )(b) | aRb} ∈ D. Then by the preliminary
result and upward closure,
∧
{v(X)(b) | aRb} ∈ D, and this says v(X)(a) ∈ D, so
v(X) ∈ LGa→D.
2. Similar to 1.
3. Let a ∈ G be arbitrary and assume v(X), v(Y ) ∈ LGa→D. Then v(X)(a) ∈ D, and so∧
{v(X)(b) | aRb} ∈ D. Let b be any member of G such that aRb. Then
∧
{v(X)(b) |
aRb} ≤ v(X)(b) and, since D is upward closed, v(X)(b) ∈ D. Similarly v(Y )(b) ∈ D.
Since D is closed under ∧, v(X ∧ Y )(b) = v(X)(b) ∧ v(Y )(b) ∈ D. Since b was arbitrary,
{v(X ∧ Y )(b) | aRb} ⊆ D, and since D is a complete filter,
∧
{v(X ∧ Y )(b) | aRb} ∈ D,
that is v((X ∧ Y ))(a) ∈ D, and so v((X ∧ Y )) ∈ LGa→D.
4. This is similar to item 3. Recall that since D is completely prime, so is LGa→D by Proposi-
tion 2.5.
5. Assume v(X) ∈ DG Then for every b ∈ G we have v(X)(b) ∈ D, and so for each a ∈ G,
{v(X)(b) | aRb} ⊆ D. Then v(X)(a) =
∧
{v(X)(b) | aRb} ∈ D because D is a complete
filter.
6. A good exercise for the reader.
6 Many Valued Quantified Logics
Quantified many valued logic have an algebraic structure similar to that of many valued modal
logic, Section 5, though of course there are substantial differences too. Here are the basic ideas.
We use Q for the set of formulas of a quantified language. There is an alphabet of free
variables, for which we informally write x, y, etc., with or without subscripts. There is an
infinite family of n-ary predicate letters, P , Q, R, etc., for each n. We do not have constant
or function symbols. As punctuation there is a comma and a pair of parentheses. An atomic
formula is of the form P (x1, . . . , xn), where P is n-ary. We have two quantifiers, ∀ and ∃.
Formulas are built up from atomic formulas using ∧, ∨, and ¬ in the usual way, and also ∀xY
and ∃xY are formulas provided x is a variable and Y is a formula.
Semantically, quantifiers quantify over some domain which is required to be non-empty.
The domain is a parameter of our work, much like a frame is for modal logics. Formulas can
contain free variables, and a function which here is called an assignment maps these variables to
members of the domain. Just as modal valuations behave differently at different possible worlds,
a quantificational valuation will not simply assign a truth value to a formula, but to a formula
with respect to a choice of assignment, thus assignments and possible worlds play analogous
roles. We introduce some notation and terminology that helps make this analogy more obvious.
Definition 6.1 (Assignment) Let V be the set of variables of our language Q, and let D be a
domain, assumed to be non-empty. σ is an assignment in D if σ is a mapping from the variables
of language Q to D, and thus σ ∈ DV . We abbreviate DV by A (for ‘assignment’) leaving both
V and D implicit.
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Very much analogous to the modal case, Definition 5.1, a family of mappings is introduced
to interpret quantification. These are functions from LA to itself, where L is a many-valued
space of truth values, a complete Morgan algebra. The mappings are denoted ∀x and ∃x, for
each variable x. Note that LA is itself a complete Morgan algebra, with the ordering defined
pointwise.
Definition 6.2 (Quantificational Mappings) Let L be a complete Morgan algebra, our
space of truth values. Let D be a non-empty domain, and let A = DV be our space of as-
signments in D. For σ, τ ∈ A we suggestively write σRxτ to mean σ and τ agree on all variables
except (possibly) for x. For each f ∈ LA:
∀xf = λσ.
∧
{f(τ) | τ ∈ A and σRxτ}
∃xf = λτ.
∨
{f(τ) | τ ∈ A and σRxτ}.
These operations are duals, that is, we have the following counterpart of Proposition 5.2.
We omit the proof.
Proposition 6.3 (Duality) For the mappings ∀x and ∃x from LA to itself, and for each f ∈
LA, ∀xf = ∃xf and ∃xf = ∀xf .
Exactly as in the modal case, these operations have a monotonicity property, whose proof
we omit.
Proposition 6.4 (Monotonicity) In the complete Morgan algebra LA, if f ≤ g then ∀xf ≤
∀xg and ∃xf ≤ ∃xg.
Now we come to quantificational valuations, which are much like modal valuations except
that the role of individual variables needs to be taken into account.
Definition 6.5 (Quantificational Valuation) Let L be a complete Morgan algebra, our
space of truth values. Let D be a non-empty domain, and let A = DV be our space of assign-
ments in D. A quantificational valuation v is a member of (LA)Q that meets certain conditions.
The first addresses the presence of individual variables.
A valuation v must meet the following free variable condition. For assignments σ, τ ∈ A, if
σ and τ agree on the free variables of atomic formula A, then v(A)(σ) = v(A)(τ).
A valuation must meet the familiar conditions for ∧, ∨, and ¬ from (1). In addition, it uses
Definition 6.2 to interpret quantification. Specifically, we have the following.
v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y )




Analogously to the modal case, the quantificational cases expand to the following.
v(∀xY )(σ) =
∧
{v(Y )(τ) | τ ∈ A and σRxτ}
v(∃xY )(σ) =
∨
{v(Y )(τ) | τ ∈ A and σRxτ}.
(4)
And of course we have the following by Proposition 6.3: v(∀xX)(σ) = v(¬∃x¬X)(σ), and
v(∃xX)(σ) = v(¬∀x¬X)(σ).
Finally, the free variable condition from Definition 6.5 is at the atomic level, but it extends
generally. The proof is by induction on formula degree, and is omitted.
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Proposition 6.6 For any formula X, if assignments σ and τ agree on the free variables of X
then v(X)(σ) = v(X)(τ) for every valuation v.
The terminology and general setup we use, when narrowed to two-valued logic, is not quite
what one finds in treatments of classical first-order logic. A classical model specification typically
has a domain D and an interpretation, assigning to each n-ary relation symbol P of the language
Q some n-ary relation I(P ) on D. To mimic that with the present machinery, let us take L
to be the classical two valued space, {0, 1}, with the operations ∧, ∨, ¬, and with Boolean
negation as involution. The designated space of truth values is D = {1}. Suppose we have an
interpretation I in the standard sense. Let us say a valuation v is I compliant if, for each n,
each n-ary relation symbol P of the language, and each assignment σ,
v(P (x1, . . . , xn))(σ) = 1 if 〈σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)〉 ∈ I(P )
v(P (x1, . . . , xn))(σ) = 0 otherwise.
Then, using an I compliant valuation amounts to working in the classical model whose inter-
pretation function is I. Having noted this, we do not mention interpretations further.
We have a local, global split similar to the one that we had in the modal case, and so we
introduce sequent notations analogous to those from Definition 5.5. Here we write Q〈L,D,D〉
to indicate we are talking about quantificational validity using truth values from L, with D as
the designated set of values, and with quantificational domain D.
Definition 6.7 (Quantificational Consequence) Let 〈L,D〉 be an upclosed complete logi-
cal Morgan algebra and let D be a non-empty domain with A = DV as the set of assignments.
Universal For each quantificational valuation v in LA,
Validity: Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
u
=⇒ ∆ if
v(X) ∈ DA for all X ∈ Γ implies v(Y ) ∈ DA for some Y ∈ ∆
Q〈L,D,D〉 |= Γ u=⇒ ∆ if
Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
u
=⇒ ∆ for every quantificational valuation v in LA
Instance For each quantificational valuation v in LA,
Validity: Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
i
=⇒ ∆ at σ ∈ A if
v(X) ∈ LAσ→D for all X ∈ Γ implies v(Y ) ∈ LAσ→D for some Y ∈ ∆






=⇒ ∆ at each σ ∈ A
Q〈L,D,D〉 |= Γ i=⇒ ∆ if
Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
i
=⇒ ∆ for every quantificational valuation v
Example 6.8 The modal Example 5.6 based on classical propositional logic has a quantifica-
tional analog. As before, let L be the classical structure {0, 1}, with D = {1} as the designated
set of truth values, a complete, completely prime filter. Also let D be any non-empty domain of
quantification. The space of valuations consists of those members of (LA)Q that meet the free
variable condition and that respect the behavior of the propositional connectives and quantifiers
(Definition 6.5), where A is the space of assignments.
As in Example 5.6, the function space filter DA contains a single function, mapping every
assignment in A to 1. Then for a valuation v, v(X) ∈ DA says that v assigns truth to X
under every assignment of values in D to variables. This is equivalent to saying that v maps
the universal closure of X to 1, that is, to truth. Then Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
u
=⇒ ∆ says that if the
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universal closure of every formula of Γ is valid in model v, then the universal closure of some
formula of ∆ is valid in model v.
The function space filter LDσ→D consists of functions that are arbitrary on assignments except
for σ, which maps to 1. So v(X) ∈ LDσ→D says that in the model v, X is true under assignment
σ. And then Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
i
=⇒ ∆ says that in model v, each assignment that makes every
member of Γ true makes some formula of ∆ true.
Modal Propositions 5.8 and 5.9 have direct quantificational counterparts, with essentially
the same proofs. We state them here, skipping the proofs.
Proposition 6.9 Let 〈L,D〉 be an upclosed complete logical Morgan algebra, let D be a non-
empty domain, and let A = DV be the set of assignments. We have the following.
1. For each valuation v in LA, if Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
i
=⇒ Y then Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v Γ
u
=⇒ Y . (As
before, there is a singleton set on the right of the sequent arrows.)
2. If Q〈L,D,D〉 |= Γ i=⇒ Y then Q〈L,D,D〉 |= Γ u=⇒ Y .
3. Neither of the above extend to arbitrary sets on the right of the sequents.
Proposition 6.10 Let 〈L,D〉 be an upclosed complete logical Morgan algebra, let D be a non-
empty domain, and let A = DV be the set of assignments.
1. Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∀x(X ∧ Y )
i
=⇒ ∀xX and Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∀x(X ∧ Y )
i
=⇒ ∀xY .
2. Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∃xX
i
=⇒ ∃x(X ∨ Y ) and Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∃xY
i
=⇒ ∃x(X ∨ Y ).
3. If D is a complete filter, Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∀xX,∀xY → ∀x(X ∧ Y ).
4. If D is a completely prime filter, Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v ∃x(X ∨ Y )
i
=⇒ ∃xX,∃xY .
5. If D is a complete filter, Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v X
u
=⇒ ∀xX.
6. Q〈L,D,D〉 |=v X
i
=⇒ ∀xX is not generally true, though it is if x does not occur free in
X.
7 Bilattices Briefly
Bilattices play a central role in what we do here. This section contains a summary of what we
need, with few proofs. Details of bilattices can be found in a number of places. A recent survey
is [11], [14]. Bilattices, are lattices with two orderings. Different conditions can be imposed,
and so there are several versions of bilattices. To keep terminology at a minimum here, the
convention used in [13] will be followed: we use bilattice for what would more fully be bounded
interlaced bilattice with negation and conflation that commute. All this is spelled out below, but
withoug much intuitive background.
Definition 7.1 (Bilattice) A bilattice (in this paper) is a structure B = 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 with two
partial orderings, ≤t (the truth ordering) and ≤k (the information ordering). These meet the
following conditions.
1. Each partial ordering is a lattice. Meet and join with respect to ≤t are denoted ∧ and ∨.
Meet and join with respect to ≤k are denoted ⊗ and ⊕.
2. Each partial ordering is bounded. The ordering ≤t has a least element, f , and a greatest,
t. The ordering ≤k has a least element, ⊥, and a greatest, >. All four are distinct.
3. The two orderings are interlaced, the operations of each lattice are monotonic with respect
to the other lattice:
(a) x ≤t y implies x⊗ z ≤t y ⊗ z,
(b) x ≤t y implies x⊕ z ≤t y ⊕ z,
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(c) x ≤k y implies x ∧ z ≤k y ∧ z,
(d) x ≤k y implies x ∨ z ≤k y ∨ z.
4. There are two order reversing involutions. Negation, written as ¬x, reverses ≤t but does
not change ≤k. Conflation, written as −x, reverses ≤k but does not change ≤t The two
operations commute, ¬ − x = −¬x.
The following items can be proved.
¬(a ∧ b) = (¬a ∨ ¬b)
¬(a ∨ b) = (¬a ∧ ¬b)
−(a ∧ b) = (−a ∧ −b)
−(a ∨ b) = (−a ∨ −b)
−(a⊗ b) = (−a⊕−b)
−(a⊕ b) = (−a⊗−b)
¬(a⊗ b) = (¬a⊗ ¬b)
¬(a⊕ b) = (¬a⊕ ¬b)
f ⊗ t = ⊥
f ⊕ t = >
⊥ ∧> = f
⊥ ∨> = t
Definition 7.2 (Complete Bilattice) A bilattice B is complete if arbitrary meets and joins
exist with respect to both orderings. For a subset {ai | i ∈ I} of the bilattice, meet and join with









a∈I ai. Bilattice B is infinitarily interlaced if the interlacing conditions above extend to
arbitrary sets.




















Definition 7.3 (Valuation) A propositional valuation in a bilattice B = 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 is a map-
ping v from atomic formula of L to members of B. Valuations are extended to all formulas of L
using the lattice operations of the truth ordering.
v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y )
v(X ∨ Y ) = v(X) ∨ v(Y )
v(¬X) = ¬v(X)
The following monotonicity result is now easy, using interlacing and the fact that negation
does not change ≤k.
Proposition 7.4 (Information Monotonicity) Let v, w be propositional valuations in bilat-
tice B. If v(P ) ≤k w(P ) for every atomic formula P , then v(X) ≤k w(X) for every formula
X.
There is a simple way of constructing bilattices, and complete bilattices, starting with Mor-
gan algebras.
Definition 7.5 (Bilattice Product) Let L be a Morgan algebra with ≤ as the partial order-
ing and x as the involution of x. The bilattice product of L with itself is LL = 〈L×L,≤t,≤k〉
where the structure is defined as follows.
1. 〈a, b〉 ≤t 〈c, d〉 iff a ≤ c and d ≤ b
2. 〈a, b〉 ≤k 〈c, d〉 iff a ≤ c and b ≤ d
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3. ¬〈a, b〉 = 〈b, a〉
4. −〈a, b〉 = 〈b, a〉
It is always the case that a bilattice product, as defined above, is an interlaced bilattice
with negation and conflation that commute. Indeed, every interlaced bilattice with commuting
negation and conflation is isomorphic to such a product, though we will not need this. In
addition, L is a complete lattice if and only if the product L L is a complete bilattice.
For motivation of the product construction, think of 〈a, b〉 as encoding that there is evidence
a for some proposition and evidence b against. Evidences for and against are allowed to be
incomplete or inconsistent, but we leave just what this means vague. Degree of truth goes up
if evidence for goes up while evidence against goes down. (Note the reversal of the ordering of
b and d in the definition of ≤t.) Degree of information goes up if both the degree of evidence
for and the degree of evidence against goes up. Negation switches the roles of for and against.
Conflation is more complicated. If a is evidence for something, a represents that which is not
evidence for that thing, and similarly for evidence against. Then −〈a, b〉 arises from 〈a, b〉 by
replacing evidence for by whatever was not evidence against, while evidence against is replaced
by whatever was not evidence for.
The extreme elements of a bilattice product are ⊥ = 〈0, 0〉, > = 〈1, 1〉, f = 〈0, 1〉, and
t = 〈1, 0〉, where 0 is the least member of L and 1 is the greatest. So f represents no evidence
for, but total evidence against, and similarly for the other cases. The bilattice operations can
be shown to be the following, where on the right of the equality signs are the underlying lattice
joins and meets of L. The right hand column assumes the lattice is complete.
〈a, b〉 ∧ 〈c, d〉 = 〈a ∧ c, b ∨ d〉
〈a, b〉 ∨ 〈c, d〉 = 〈a ∨ c, b ∧ d〉
〈a, b〉 ⊗ 〈c, d〉 = 〈a ∧ c, b ∧ d〉
〈a, b〉 ⊕ 〈c, d〉 = 〈a ∨ c, b ∨ d〉
∧





















If members of bilattices are to play the role of generalized truth values, some notion of
designated element is needed. In [1] the notions of a prime bifilter and a logical bilattice were
introduced. We only need weaker versions here, and we introduce the term upbiclosed. It would
be useful to recall the terminology from Definition 2.2.
Definition 7.6 Let B = 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 be a bilattice, and let D be a proper, non-empty subset of
B.
1. D is upbiclosed if it is upwardly closed with respect to both orderings ≤t and ≤k.
2. 〈B, D〉 is an upbiclosed logical bilattice if D is an upbiclosed set.
It is easy to check that for a Morgan algebra L, with D ⊆ L, D is upwardly closed in L
if and only if D × L is upbiclosed in the bilattice L  L. Then, 〈L,D〉 is an upclosed logical
Morgan algebra if and only if 〈L L,D × L〉 is an upbiclosed logical bilattice.
For our purposes we will not want the entire of a bilattice. It is what is called the anticon-
sistent part that is usefu to usl. Reasons for the terminology, and a general discussion of why
it is of interest can be found in [11], [14].
Definition 7.7 (Anticonsistent, Exact) A member x of a bilattice is anticonsistent if −x ≤k
x, and is exact if x = −x. (There is also the notion of being consistent, x ≤k −x, but it will
not be needed here.)
In a product bilattice LL, where L is a Morgan algebra, the definition above has a useful
equivalent form: 〈a, b〉 is anticonsistent if a ≤ b or equivalently b ≤ a, and 〈a, b〉 is exact if a = b
or equivalently if a = b.
Below are some important and useful properties of exactness and anticonsistency (and con-
sistency because, why not).
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Proposition 7.8 In any bilattice B we have the following.
1. The sets of exact values, consistent values, and anticonsistent values are closed under ∧,
∨, and ¬.
2. If B is a complete bilattice, the sets of exact values, consistent values, and anticonsistent





3. The sets of exact values, consistent values, and anticonsistent values each contain f and
t.
4. ⊥ is consistent and > is anticonsistent.
5. If x is anticonsistent and x ≤k y then y is anticonsistent. Likewise if x is consistent and
y ≤k x then y is consistent.
6. If x and y are exact and x ≤k y, then x = y.
Proof Assume we work in a bilattice B.
1. Suppose x, y are anticonsistent, so −x ≤k x and −y ≤k y. Then −(x ∧ y) = −x ∧ −y ≤k
x ∧ y, using interlacing, so x ∧ y is anticonsistent. The other cases are similar.
2. Similar to 1, using the infinitary interlacing conditions.
3. For every x ∈ B, −x ≤t t since t is the truth ordering maximal element. Then x ≤t −t
since conflation does not affect the truth ordering. Since x is arbitrary, −t is maximal, so
−t = t, making t exact, anticonsistent, and consistent. The other cases are similar.
4. Similar to 3.
5. Suppose x is anticonsistent, so −x ≤k x. Also suppose x ≤k y. Then −y ≤k −x ≤k x ≤k y,
so y is anticonsistent. The other case is similar.
6. Suppose x, y are exact, and x ≤k y. Then y = −y ≤k −x = x, so x = y.
We introduce some notation that will allow us to state things relatively easily. It is not the
same as that of [12], but the relationship between the two notations is straightforward.
Definition 7.9 Let B be a bilattice. A(B) is the subset of anticonsistent members of B. We will
write A(B) = 〈A(B),≤t〉 if we want to indicate we are interested in the anticonsistent members
of B under the truth ordering of the bilattice, and similarly with ≤k. We use E(B) in a similar
way for the subset of exact members of B, again with or without orderings specified. Further,
if S is a set of members of bilattice B, by A(S) and E(S) we mean the set of anticonsistent
(respectively exact) members of B that are in S, but with no ordering considered.
It follows from Proposition 7.8 that both 〈A(B),≤t〉 and 〈E(B),≤t〉 are Morgan algebras
(with negation as De Morgan involution), and are complete Morgan algebras if B is a complete
bilattice. It follows that if L is a complete Morgan algebra, L  L is a complete bilattice, and
so 〈A(L L),≤t〉 and 〈E(L L),≤t〉 are both complete Morgan algebras.
Finally, just as we had function space lattices, Definition 2.3, there are function space bilat-
tices.
Definition 7.10 (Function Space Biattices) Suppose B = 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 is a bilattice and S
is a non-empty set. The function space bilattice BS = 〈BS ,≤t,≤k〉 has for its domain the set
of all functions from S to B, with orderings defined pointwise. That is, for f, g ∈ BS , f ≤t g if
and only if f(x) ≤t g(x) in B for all x ∈ S; and likewise f ≤k g if and only if f(x) ≤k g(x) in B
for all x ∈ S.
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The function space BS will be infinitarily interlaced if B is. The pointwise definitions of the
operations imply that, in a function space bilattice, f ∧ g is the function such that (f ∧ g)(x) =
f(x) ∧ g(x) for all x ∈ B, and similarly for the other bilattice operations. Likewise if B is a
complete bilattice so is the function space bilattice BS , and in it
∧
i∈S fi is the function such




i∈S fi(x), and similarly for the other infinitary operators.
Definition 7.9 is useful here for simplifying the statement of a couple of important items. For a
bilattice B and a non-empty set S, A(BS) = [A(B)]S , and likewise E(BS) = [E(B)]S . All this is
straightforward to verify, and is assumed in what follows.
8 Modal Strict/Tolerant Structures
We now reach the first payoff point of the paper. We show how to construct a strict/tolerant
counterpart for each of our many valued modal structures. We begin with a very fast summary
our earlier propositional construction from [12]. Then we lift this to the function space level, so
we can bring in an interpretation for the modal operators.
Propositional Level: For the rest of this short propositional discussion we employ the
propositional language L, containing the connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬, but no modal operators
or quantifiers. In [12] the following was shown. The upclosed logical Morgan algebra 〈L,D〉
validates the same sequents in the many valued sense as the strict/tolerant structure 〈A(L 
L), E(D × L),A(D × L)〉 does in the strict/tolerant sense, where A(L  L) = 〈A(L  L),≤t〉,
that is, we use the bilattice truth ordering restricted to the antioconsistent part. Unwinding the
notation, the strict/tolerant structure has as its space of truth values the anticonsistent part of
LL, the strictly designated values are the exact part of D×L, and the tolerantly designated
values are the anticonsistent part of D × L.
The proof from [12] actually made use of an intermediate structure, 〈E(L  L), E(D × L)〉,
where E(L  L) = 〈E(L  L),≤t〉. This is a many valued structure within the bilattice L  L,
and was shown to be isomorphic to 〈L,D〉 on the one hand, and on the other hand to validate
the same sequents as the strict/tolerant 〈A(LL), E(D×L),A(D×L)〉, thus establishing the
connection between the strict/tolerant structure and 〈L,D〉.
It will be convenient to sketch why 〈L,D〉 and 〈E(L  L), E(D × L)〉 are isomorphic. The
proof is short, and we will need parts of it below. In remarks following Definition 7.7 we noted
that in product bilattices, the exact members are those of the form 〈x, x〉. It is easy to see that
〈x, x〉 ≤t 〈y, y〉 in E(L  L) if and only if x ≤ y in L, so it follows that 〈E(L  L),≤t〉 is an
isomorphic copy of the Morgan algebra 〈L,≤〉.
Going further, we saw in Section 7 that D is upwardly closed in L if and only if D × L is
upbiclosed in L  L. Further, x ∈ D if and only if 〈x, y〉 ∈ D × L for every y if and only if
〈x, x〉 ∈ E(D × L). Putting all this together, 〈L,D〉 is an upclosed complete logical Morgan
algebra if and only if 〈E(L L), E(D × L)〉 is, and the two are isomorphic.
Table 3 summarizes the details of what was just said. In it MV (for many valued) is an
upclosed logical Morgan algebra. BMV (for bilattice many valued) is also an upclosed logical
Morgan algebra that is isomorphic to MV but is a subsystem of a product bilattice. ST is a
strict/tolerant structure for which S marks the strictly designated truth values and T marks
the tolerant set of values.
Now we want to lift things from the underlying propositional truth value space to a function
space to accomodate the modal operators.
Modal Level: For the rest of the discussion in this section the formal language isM which,
in addition to the propositional connectives, also has the modal operators  and ♦. We work
with an upclosed complete Morgan algebra 〈L,D〉, and with a modal frame F = 〈G,R〉. In
Section 5 we saw that the complete Morgan algebra LG , a function space, could interpret the
modal operators as well as the propositional connectives. But also we saw in Section 7 that
A(LL) is a complete Morgan algebra, so the function space A(LL)G is yet another complete
Morgan algebra, for which definitions of   and   can be given. We thus have mappings of the
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Truth Value Set Designated Set
MV L D
BMV E(L L) E(D × L)
ST A(L L)
S : E(D × L)
T : A(D × L)
Table 3: Propositional Model Structures
following two types, both given by Definition 5.1. We use the same operator notation for both
types since no confusion should result.
  : LG → LG
  : L
G → LG
  : A(L L)G → A(L L)G
  : A(L L)G → A(L L)G
Though it is not used for our main results, it is of interest to note that the operations  
and   on LG and on A(L  L)G have direct connections with each other. In the statements
below π1 and π2 are projection functions, mapping ordered pairs to their first and their second
components respectively. Now, for f ∈ A(L L)G and for a ∈ G:
 f = λa.〈 (π1f)(a),  (π2f)(a)〉
 f = λa.〈  (π1f)(a), (π2f)(a)〉.
We check the first of these.
( f)(a) =
∧
{f(b) | aRb} Def 5.1 for A(L L)G
=
∧





{(π2f)(b) | aRb}〉 (5)
= 〈 (π1f)(a),  (π2f)(a)〉 Def 5.1 for LG
We now have the modal language M interpreted in both LG and A(L L)G , with proposi-
tional connectives interpreted using bilattice truth operations and modal operators interpreted
as above. Before moving on, here are a few small but useful items.
Proposition 8.1 (Exactness Closure) Suppose v is a valuation of modal language M in
[A(L L)]G (where L is complete). If v(P ) is exact for every propositional letter P then v(X)
is exact for every formula of M. More briefly, if v(P ) ∈ [E(L L)]G for every atomic P , then
v(X) ∈ [E(L L)]G for every modal formula X.
Proof By induction on the complexity of X. The atomic case is given. Conjunction, disjunc-
tion, and negation use item 1 of Proposition 7.8. The modal cases, using Definition 5.1, follow
using item 2 of Proposition 7.8.
Proposition 8.2 (Information Order Monotonicity) Let v, w be valuations, mapping the
modal language M into [A(L L)]G. Using the knowledge ordering from the bilattice (L L)G
we have the following. If v(P ) ≤k w(P ) for each propositional letter P , then v(X) ≤k w(X) for
each modal formula X of M.
Proof The proof is by induction on formula complexity. Assume v(P ) ≤k w(P ) for each
propositional letter P . We thus have the base case by assumption.
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Suppose v(X) ≤k w(X). Then for each a ∈ G, v(X)(a) ≤k w(X)(a) in the bilattice L  L.
It follows by the properties of negation that v(¬X)(a) = ¬v(X)(a) ≤k ¬w(X)(a) = w(¬X)(a),
for each a ∈ G. Then v(¬X) ≤k w(¬X).
The argument is similar for the other propositional connectives using the interlacing con-
ditions from Definition 7.1. The modal cases follow using Definition 5.1 and the infinitary
interlacing conditions from Definition 7.2.
We next turn to designated sets of truth values, and hence to their corresponding consequence
relations.
For L we assumed we have an upclosed set D as the set of designated truth values. Then
Definition 2.4 gives us both global and local versions of designated set on the function space LG ,
denoted DG and LGa→D respectively. Since D is upclosed in L, both of these are upclosed in L
G ,
Proposition 2.5, so each of 〈LG , DG〉 and 〈LG , LGa→D〉 are upclosed logical Morgan algebras. Each
gives us a consequence relation, Definition 5.5:
m
=⇒ for model validity, the global version using
DG , and
p
=⇒ for possible world validity, the local version using LGa→D. From now on, it is the
choice of designated set that plays a direct role; the resulting consequence relation is secondary.
The basic many valued setup is summarized in the first line of Table 4.
Truth Value Set Global Designated Set Local Designated Set
MV LG DG LGa→D
BMV [E(L L)]G [E(D × L)]G [E(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L)
ST [A(L L)]G
S: [E(D × L)]G
T: [A(D × L)]G
S: [A(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L)
T: [A(L× L)]Ga→A(D×L)
Table 4: Modal Model Structures
Just as hapened in the propositional case, there is an isomorphic version of MV, occurring
within the bilattice structure itself. This has the truth value structure [E(L  L)]G = 〈[E(L 
L)]G ,≤t〉 as shown on the BMV line. The isomorphism θ : LG → [E(L L)]G given by
θ(f) = λa.〈f(a), f(a)〉
is one-one, onto, and preserves the ordering relation. Further, it maps DG to [E(D × L)]G and
LGa→D to [E(L×L)]Ga→E(D×L). All this establishes that the BMV line of the table does contain an
isomorphic version of the MV line.
The ST line of Table 4 gives us two different versions of strict/tolerant modal structures, and
consequently of logics, one of a global nature, the other local. It remains to show that validity
for the two many valued BMV consequence relations is the same as for the two strict/tolerant
ST consequence relations. At their core our proofs are the same as in our earlier papers. We
begin with a formulation of some simple common features shared by both the global and the
local columns of Table 4. These allow us to give a uniform proof covering both cases together.
Essentially, all the unpleasant detail work is concentrated here.
Common Properties 8.3 In Table 4 the following hold in both the local and the global case.
1. The ST strict and the ST tolerant designated sets have the same exact subset, and it is the
BMV designated set.
2. Any exact function below a member of the ST strict designated set, in the ≤k ordering, is
designated in BMV.
3. The ST tolerant designated set is upward closed under the ≤k ordering.
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4. Let > be the largest member of the bilattice (L  L)G in the ≤k ordering. > is in the ST
tolerant designated set, but is not in the strict designated set.
Proof There are four items to be proved, each of which has a global and a local case.
1. The global case is trivial. The local case is straightforward, and is left to the reader.
2. First the global case. Suppose g is in the strict designated set, that is, g ∈ [E(D × L)]G ,
f ≤k g, and f is exact. Note that g is also exact. By Proposition 7.8 part 6, f = g, so
f ∈ [E(D × L)]G which is the BMV global designated set.
Next the local case. Suppose g ∈ [A(L×L)]Ga→E(D×L), f ≤k g, and f is exact. If b 6= a then
f(b), being exact, must be in E(L× L). And for the case of a, f(a) ≤k g(a) ∈ E(D × L).
But then both f(a) and g(a) are exact, so by Proposition 7.8 part 6 again, f(a) = g(a),
so f(a) ∈ E(D×L). We then have f ∈ [E(L×L)]Ga→E(D×L), the BVM local designated set.
3. We do the global case first. Suppose f ∈ [A(D × L)]G and f ≤k g. Let a be an arbitrary
member of G. Then f(a) ∈ A(D × L), so f(a) is anticonsistent and in D × L. We have
f(a) ≤k g(a), so g(a) is anticonsistent by Proposition 7.8 part 5, and g(a) ∈ D×L because
D is upward closed (as is L of course). Then g(a) ∈ A(D × L) for every a ∈ G, and so
g ∈ [A(D × L)]G .
For the local case, suppose f ∈ [A(L × L)]Ga→A(D×L) and f ≤k g. If b 6= a, f(b) is
anticonsistent in L  L, and since f ≤k g, the same is true for g(b) by Proposition 7.8
part 5. Then g(b) ∈ A(L × L). For the case of a, f(a) ∈ A(D × L) and hence g(a) is
anticonsistent by Proposition 7.8 part 5 again, and g(a) ∈ D × L because D is upward
closed. So g(a) ∈ A(D × L).
4. > is the function that maps every member of G to the largest member of LL in the ≤k
ordering. In turn this largest member is 〈1, 1〉, where 1 is the largest member of L.
First the global case. Since D is upward closed and non-empty, 1 ∈ D, so 〈1, 1〉 ∈ D × L.
Also, using Proposition 7.8 item 4, 〈1, 1〉 is anticonsistent. Then 〈1, 1〉 ∈ A(D × L), so
> ∈ [A(D × L)]G , the global tolerant designated set. But > 6∈ [E(D × L)]G because
〈1, 1〉 6∈ E(D × L), because 〈1, 1〉 is not exact.
Finally the local case. For > to be in [A(L × L)]Ga→A(D×L) it is enough that > map a to
A(D × L). And we saw in the argument for the global case that the image of a, which is
〈1, 1〉, is in this set. On the other hand, for > to be in [A(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L), > should map
a to E(D × L), but we have seen that 〈1, 1〉 is not in this set.
In what follows we handle both the global and local cases of designated sets simultaneously,
and we introduce some notation to make this easier. We use D for either the global or the
local designated sets for BMV in Table 4, and S and T for the corresponding strict and tolerant
designated sets in ST. Table 5 gives the definitions more precisely. And here is a restatement
of the Common Properties, using this notation.
Case D S T
Global [E(D × L)]G [E(D × L)]G [A(D × L)]G
Local [E(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L) [A(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L) [A(L× L)]Ga→A(D×L)
Table 5: Uniform Notation
Common Properties 8.4 (Uniform Version) Using notation from Table 5, the items from
Common Properties 8.3 are the following.
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1. E(S) = E(T) = D.
2. If f ∈ S, g ≤k f , and g is exact, then g ∈ D.
3. If f ∈ T and f ≤k g then g ∈ T.
4. > ∈ T but > 6∈ S (where > is the largest member of (L  L)G under the information
ordering).
With all this set up, we are finally in a position to prove the main results of this section.
The first two Propositions below together show that for each modal model built on a complete
logical Morgan algebra there is a corresponding strict/tolerant veersion that validates the same
sequents, whether we use the local or the global notion of designated truth value. But the
Morgan structure and the strict/tolerant structure differ on the local version of cut. In all of
what follows in this section, L is a complete Morgan algebra (of truth values), and D is an
upclosed subset (of designated truth values).
Proposition 8.5 If the modal M sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is not valid in the many valued structure
〈[E(L L)]G ,D〉, it is not valid in the strict/tolerant structure 〈[A(L L)]G ,S,T〉.
Proof Assume the M sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is not valid in 〈[E(L  L)]G ,D〉, and v is a valuation
that invalidates it. That is, v maps formulas to [E(L  L)]G , and v(X) ∈ D for all X ∈ Γ but
v(Y ) 6∈ D for every Y ∈ ∆.
Since exact values are also anticonsistent, v is a valuation in [A(L  L)]G as well. v maps
all of Γ to D, which is E(S) by Common Properties 8.4(1), a subset of S, so v maps all
of Γ to S. If v(Y ) ∈ T for some Y ∈ ∆, then v(Y ) would have to be in the exact subset of
it, since v maps formulas to [E(L  L)]G . But this exact subset is E(T) = D, by Common
Properties 8.4(1) again, which does not contain v(Y ). Thus v(Y ) 6∈ T. Then v invalidates
Γ =⇒ ∆ in the strict/tolerant sense in 〈[A(L L)]G ,S,T〉 as well.
Proposition 8.6 If the modal M sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is not valid in the strict/tolerant structure
〈[A(L L)]G ,S,T〉, it is not valid in the many valued structure 〈[E(L L)]G ,D〉.
Proof This time assume the sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is not valid in 〈[A(L  L)]G ,S,T〉 in the
strict/tolerant sense, and valuation v invalidates it. Then v is a valuation in [A(L  L)]G
such that v(X) ∈ S for every X ∈ Γ, and for every Y ∈ ∆, v(Y ) 6∈ T.
The problem is that for each formula Z, v(Z) maps G to A(LL), but for a counter-model
in 〈[E(L  L)]G ,D〉 we need a mapping from G to E(L  L). We define a new valuation v′ as
follows. For an atomic formula A, and a ∈ G, we have that v(A)(a) = 〈x, y〉 ∈ A(L  L); we
set v′(A)(a) = 〈x, x〉 ∈ E(L L). Since this is for any a ∈ G, we have defined v′(A) for atomic
A. Extend v′ to all formulas ofM by recursion on formula complexity. Proposition 8.1 gives us
that this is a valuation in [E(L L)]G .
Suppose A is atomic, and a ∈ G. Then v(A)(a) = 〈x, y〉 for some x, y ∈ L and then
v′(A)(a) = 〈x, x〉. Since 〈x, y〉 is anticonsistent x ≤ y, and so 〈x, x〉 ≤k 〈x, y〉. This shows that
v′(A)(a) ≤k v(A)(a). Since a was arbitrary, for every atomic A, v′(A) ≤k v(A) in [E(L L)]G .
Then by Proposition 8.2, for every formula Z, v′(Z) ≤k v(Z) in [E(L L)]G .
Finally we show v′ does not validate Γ =⇒ ∆ in 〈[E(L  L)]G ,D〉. Suppose X ∈ Γ. We
know that v(X) ∈ S. We also know that v′(X) is exact, and we know that v′(X) ≤k v(X), so
by Common Properties 8.4(2), v′(X) ∈ D. And this is for every X ∈ Γ.
Suppose Y ∈ ∆. If we had v′(Y ) ∈ T, since v′(Y ) ≤k v(Y ), then by Common Proper-
ties 8.4(3) we would have v(Y ) ∈ T, which is not the case. So v′(Y ) 6∈ T. Then v′(Y ) 6∈ E(T)
and so by Common Properties 8.4(1), v′(Y ) 6∈ D. We thus have that v′ does not validate
Γ =⇒ ∆ in 〈[E(L L)]G ,D〉.
Proposition 8.7 For modal M formulas, the metaconsequence scheme
Γ, A =⇒ ∆ Γ =⇒ ∆, A
Γ =⇒ ∆
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is locally valid in 〈[E(L L)]G ,D〉, but an instance is not locally valid in 〈[A(L L)]G ,S,T〉.
Proof Validity Suppose v is a valuation in 〈[E(LL)]G ,D〉 that validates both premise sequents
Γ, A =⇒ ∆ and Γ =⇒ ∆, A. To show v also validates Γ =⇒ ∆, we assume v(X) ∈ D for every
X ∈ Γ, and we show v(Y ) ∈ D for some Y ∈ ∆.
Since v validates Γ =⇒ ∆, A and it maps all of Γ to D, it must map some member of ∆, A
to D. If it does this for a member of ∆, we are done. Otherwise v(A) ∈ D. But then v maps all
of Γ, A to D so, since it validates Γ, A =⇒ ∆, v must map some member of ∆ to D and again
we are done.
NonValidity We consider the following scheme instance, where P is an atomic formula.
∅, P =⇒ ∅ ∅ =⇒ ∅, P
∅ =⇒ ∅
Let v be any valuation in 〈[A(LL)]G ,S,T〉 that maps P to largest member, >, of the bilattice
(LL)G . By Common Properties 8.4(4, v(P ) ∈ T but v(P ) 6∈ S. Now, v validates ∅, P =⇒ ∅
in the strict/tolerant structure 〈[A(LL)]G ,S,T〉 because it does not map one of the premises,
namely P , to S. It validates ∅ =⇒ ∅, P because it maps one of the conclusions, again P , to
T. Thus v validates both hypotheses. But v does not validate ∅ =⇒ ∅, because it maps every
member of the antecedent to a strict designated value, but there is no member of the consequent
that maps to a tolerant designated value. So v is a counterexample to the local validity of an
instance of the cut scheme.
9 Modal Examples
Before getting to the main example we examine, we briefly discuss the simplest one, leaving the
details of it to the reader. For it the underlying logical Morgan algebra is that of classical logic.
The construction from Section 5 gives us an algebraic version of standard Kripke semantics.
The corresponding strict/tolerant version that the construction in Section 8 produces is a modal
structure with the standard ST propositional logic underneath. This is exactly what one would
expect, and working through the details is a good exercise.
What we devote the rest of this section to is a somewhat more complex example. We do
not propose an intuitive meaning for this. It is meant simply as a formal example, illustrating
how the machinery presented in this paper works. Instead of the classical two valued space,
we take for our underlying complete Morgan algebra the four valued one shown in Figure 1,
ordered upward, with an involution operator given by 0 = 1, 1 = 0, α = α, and β = β. We
call this L for the rest of the section. The subset of designated truth values D is {1}, shown
circled in the diagram. This is trivially an upwardly closed set, so 〈L,D〉 is a complete upclosed
logical Morgan algebra. (D is also a filter, but is not prime.) This was used in an earlier paper
in our series on ST generalizations, as Example 8.2 of [13], where it provided an example of a
strict/tolerant logic for which an interpretation of the connectives generalizing those of the weak
Kleene three valued logic would not work. That plays no role here, but is noted for the record.
The propositional strict/tolerant truth value space given by our construction starts with a
bilattice product, L  L. It has 16 members, but we only need the anticonsistent part, which
narrows it to 9. These are shown in Figure 2. The ordering for this is the bilattice truth ordering,
and in the diagram it is the vertical direction. Thus in the diagram 〈x, y〉 ≤ 〈z, w〉 just if x ≤ z
and y ≥ w in L. The exact members are the four ‘corners’, 〈0, 1〉, 〈α, α〉, 〈β, β〉, and 〈1, 0〉, a
structure easily seen to be isomorphic to the one in Figure 1.
The counterpart of D that we use for the bilattice is D×L. This, of course, is {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, α〉,
〈1, β〉, 〈1, 1〉}. The tolerant values of A(L L) are those in D × L that are anticonsistent, and
the strict values are those that are exact. These are shown in Figure 2, exact in a small rectangle
and tolerant in a larger tilted rectangle.
To interpret the modal operators we need function spaces mapping to the structure in Fig-
ure 2. Let F = 〈G,R〉 be an arbitrary modal frame. Following Section 5, LG gives us an algebraic
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Figure 1: Morgan Algebra L
Figure 2: Anticonsistent Bilattice Values, A(L L)
version of many valued Kripke semantics, using the frame F . The corresponding strict/tolerant
modal structure has the truth value space [A(LL)]G . In both cases operations are interpreted
as in Definition 5.4, or equivalently, using the conditions (2) and (3).
Now we narrow the example down further, and work with a particular frame. There is
nothing especially significant about our choice of frame except that it is small, so one can easily
see what is happening. It consists of three possible worlds, {a, b, c}, having the accessibility
relation aRb, aRc, where these are the only cases in which accessibility holds. The frame appears
in Figure 3a. We show the strict/tolerant non-validity of local sequent ♦(P ∨ Q) p=⇒ ♦P,♦Q
at a, where P,Q are atomic. We remind the reader of Definition 5.5 and Table 4. We must
produce a valuation v in [A(L L)]G such that v(♦(P ∨Q)) ∈ [A(L× L)]Ga→E(D×L), a strict set
of values, but v(♦P ), v(♦Q) 6∈ [A(L× L)]Ga→A(D×L), a tolerant set of values. Unwinding this, we
need a valuation such that v(♦(P ∨Q)(a) ∈ E(D × L) but v(♦P )(a), v(♦Q)(a) 6∈ A(D × L).
(a) Frame F
P Q P ∨Q ♦(P ∨Q) ♦P ♦Q
a − − − 〈1, 0〉 〈α, α〉 〈β, β〉
b 〈α, α〉 〈β, 1〉 〈1, α〉 − − −
c 〈α, 1〉 〈β, β〉 〈1, β〉 − − −
(b) Truth Value Calculations
Figure 3: Strict/Tolerant Local Non-Validity at Possible World a
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The valuation v that we use is shown in Figure 3b. The columns labeled P and Q are what
define v; for instance, v(P )(b) = 〈α, α〉, and so on. In the interests of simplicity, we did not
show values for v at a since they will not enter into the calculation of what we need. We have
similarly omitted other parts of the table which are not needed. The four columns to the right of
the two defining v have calculated values. We check two cases from the table. The calculations
can be done using (2) and (3), or read from the Hasse diagram in Figure 2. We use the first
method here.
v(P ∨Q)(b) = v(P )(b) ∨ v(Q)(b)
= 〈α, α〉 ∨ 〈β, 1〉
= 〈α ∨ β, α ∧ 1〉
= 〈1, α〉
v(♦(P ∨Q))(a) = v(P ∨Q)(b) ∨ v(P ∨Q)(c)
= 〈1, α〉 ∨ 〈1, β〉
= 〈1 ∨ 1, α ∧ β〉
= 〈1, 0〉
Now, v(♦(P ∨Q))(a) = 〈1, 0〉 is in the strict set shown in Figure 2, but neither v(♦P ) and v(♦Q)
are in the tolerant set. Thus in the frame ♦(P ∨Q) p=⇒ ♦P,♦Q is not locally valid at a in the
strict/tolerant sense.
By the results in Section 8, the sequent must ♦(P ∨Q) p=⇒ ♦P,♦Q must also be not valid
at a in the many-valued sense, using the logical structure from Figure 1. The calculation shown
in Figure 4 shows this directly.
P Q P ∨Q ♦(P ∨Q) ♦P ♦Q
a − − − 1 α β
b α β 1 − − −
c α β 1 − − −
Figure 4: Many-Valued Local Non-Validity at Possible World a
10 Quantified Strict/Tolerant Structures
A look at Sections 5 and 6 will quickly show that in our algebraic setting differences between
modal and quantified many valued logics are minimal. Of course the languages,M and Q differ,
but this not major. The primary difference is that modally we have two operators,   and  ,
on the function space LG , Definition 5.1, while quantificationally we have an infinite family of
operators, ∀x, ∃x, ∀y, ∃y, . . . on the function space LA, Definition 6.2, but it is easy to see that
the algebraic behavior of both versions is really the same. Consequently we do not present a full
treatment of a quantifier counterpart of Section 8, since it would simply amount to a translation
from the one setting to the other. One could, of course, device an abstract version that had both
the modal and the quantificational as instances. Some attempts were made in this direction,
but finally it looked like the abstraction made things harder to follow without gaining much,
primarily because it was a single abstract from just two concrete cases. The present approach
seemed, and still seems, less cluttered and clearer.
11 Conclusion
It is worth noting that there is a second route to the strict/tolerant models whose construction
has been discussed in this paper. We begin by sketching the important features of the version
as presented, then those of an alternative but equivalent approach.
In this paper, given a complete logical Morgan algebra 〈L,D〉 we first constructed the bilat-
tice LL, narrowed it to the anticonsistent part, A(LL), and finally constructed the function
space [A(L  L)]S where S is the set of possible worlds of a frame in the modal case, and is
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the set of assignments in the quantifier case. The restriction to anticonsistent values is flexible
since, as we noted at the end of Section 7, [A(L L)]S and A[(L L)S ] are isomorphic. Then
ignoring the anticonsistency operator for now, the heart of our construction can be seen as first
the formation of a product bilattice L  L, then of a function space bilattice (L  L)S . One
direct advantage of this construction is that the result has the structure of a function space,
as did LS , and so it relates easily to many-valued versions of Kripke models or quantificational
structures.
The construction just sketched begins with methods that are like those of earlier papers
in the present sequence, [12], [13], [15]. These are applied in the creation of L  L, after
which a function space construction is applied. Instead, we could have proceeded as follows.
Starting with the complete Morgan algebra L, construct the function space LS first. It too
will be a complete Morgan algebra. As such, methods from the earlier papers apply directly,
and we can form the product bilattice LS  LS . The anticonsistent part of this provides us
with a strict/tolerant structure, and this is simply by applying earlier results (extended to take
completeness and modal/quantificational operators into account). The advantage of this is that
it uses earlier results directly. The disadvantage is that it produces a product bilattice, not a
function space one, and so relating the result to Kripke frames or quantificational structures is
not immediate. However it is easy to show that for sets A, B, and C, (A×B)C and AC ×BC
are isomorphic. The following are 1-1, onto, and inverses of each other.
θ : AC ×BC → (A×B)C where θ(〈f, g〉) = λx ∈ C.〈f(x), g(x)〉
η : (A×B)C → AC ×BC where η(f) = 〈π1f, π2f〉
(6)
These mappings provide an isomorphism not only at the set level, but at the full bilattice
level. That is, LSLS and (LL)S are isomorphic as bilattices. Both mappings θ and η preserve
the bilattice orderings. As an example we show the information ordering is preserved by θ. By
definition of bilattice product, 〈f1, g1〉 ≤k 〈f2, g2〉 in LS LS if both f1 ≤ f2 and g1 ≤ g2 in LS .
Since the ordering in LS is defined pointwise, this means that f1(a) ≤ f2(a) and g1(a) ≤ g2(a)
in L for all a ∈ S. But this is equivalent to saying that 〈f1(a), f2(a)〉 ≤k 〈g1(a), g2(a)〉 in the
bilattice LL for all a ∈ S. And this in turn is equivalent to saying that θ(〈f1, f2〉) ≤k θ(〈g1, g2〉)
in (L L)S .
Since θ and η preserve the two bilattice orderings, it follows that they preserve the various
bilattice meets and joins defined using those orderings. It is also easy to check that bilattice
negation is preserved. In our modal and quantificational settings it is not hard to extend all
this to versions of   and  , or ∀x, ∃x, . . . .
The upshot is that we could have proceeded as follows. Starting with 〈L,D〉, and an appro-
priate indexing set S, possible worlds or assignments, form the bilattice LSLS using machinery
from earlier papers directly, then apply the isomorphism just discussed to transition to (LL)S
(an isomorphism that also preserves the anticonsistent subsets). In short, earlier work (extended
to incorporate infinitary bilattice operators) is already sufficient for what was done here. But
it would have been somewhat more indirect and harder to follow. There is really only one con-
struct behind my creation of strict/tolerant versions for a broad range of many valued logics:
propositional, modal, quantified, based on weak Kleene operators generalized, and on strong
Kleene operators generalized. The uniformity of treatment is striking.
Finally, the question is what is all this good for. Actually, I don’t know. Here’s a very
brief sketch of the history of ST and TS investigations, with some of the primary references.
Afterwards I can explain the reasons for my problem.
What is currently called TS was introduced by Grzegorz Malinowski starting back in 1990,
in [21], [22], using the terminology of Q-consequence. The opening sentence of his first paper
on the subject directly foreshadowed much of the subsequent work in the area: “The objective
of the paper is a generalization of Tarski’s concept of consequence operation related upon the
idea that the rejection and acceptance need not be complementary.” Malinowski’s work was
motivated by the work of Roman Suszko, [28], but it would be too far afield to discuss this here.
While Malinowski’s ideas correspond to what is now called TS, in 2004 Szymon Frankowski,
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[16], [17], [18], introduced ST itself, under the name of P consequence. It was understood
that Q consequence corresponded to something like classical logic without the reflexivity of
consequence, while P consequence was similar but with transitivity removed instead. This
suggested applications to various important paradoxes, which were investigated.
At some more recent point, ST and TS were given their current names, and there has been
a notable sequence of papers, beginning with [3] and [5]. Applications specifically to issues of
vagueness have been discussed in [4]. One of the newer topics involves a hierarchy of logics,
and the basic ideas of its construction have proved to be of considerable interest, [2], [27]. And
there have been further applications to paradoxes. In particular, [19] continues the work on
nonreflexive logics, which originated with Malinowski, making use of TS. Also [20] should be
mentioned in this paper, since it examines bilatices and their generalizations. [24] and [25]
employ ST to handle languages with transparent truth while avoiding truth paradoxes, and [26]
addresses paradoxes from set theory. Clearly current research in the area is very much ongoing.
Now, why do I ask what my work is good for? All of the fundamental work cited above
took place in a three-valued setting, connecting with classical logic. My work shows that what
I have called the “strict/tolerant phenomenon” has a very broad extent. But for the impact
and significance of strict/tolerance, the single example based on classical logic is really enough.
I have no idea what the role of the rich variety of examples coming from my work might be.
Perhaps direct consequences of interest will emerge. Perhaps also, the machinery employed will
itself have further significant uses. It all seems broad and versatile, but at the moment that
opinion concerns potentiality and not actuality. To quote Michael Faraday, who was quoting
Benjamin Franklin, [6], “What good is a newborn baby?”
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